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MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA:
A LOOK AT FEDERAL & STATE RESPONSES
TO CALIFORNIA'S COMPASSIONATE
USE ACT
Allison L. Bergstrom*
INTRODUCTION
A fascinating subject confronting both the medical and criminal law fields
is the possible medical use of marijuana. Conflict centers on whether
marijuana does, in fact, provide a unique form of pain relief not found
from other available drugs. Federal government agencies, including the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), that adamantly oppose the legalization of
marijuana for medicinal purposes contend that marijuana does not provide
any significant benefit not currently available in legal pain relief
alternatives.' On the other hand, many prominent physicians and
terminally or critically ill patients strongly maintain that smoking limited
amounts of marijuana provides relief from nausea and pain that other
drugs, including synthetic forms of marijuana, fail to provide.2
Additionally, the limited legalization of other "hard drugs" including
cocaine, morphine, and methamphetamines, raises the question why the
federal government has been reluctant to give marijuana similar regulatory
treatment.
3
Despite the federal statutory prohibition of marijuana, several states
have enacted statutes legalizing marijuana possession and use for limited
"Staff Writer, DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW. B.S., Comell University, 1992;
M.B.A., M.H.S., University of Florida, 1996; J.D. (Cand.), DePaul University, 1999.
'Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499 (1992).
2Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conant v. McCaffrey, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 97-0139).
'See People v. Seeley, 940 P.2d 604, 619 (Wash. 1997).
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medicinal purposes.4 In California, the enactment of the Compassionate
Use Act5 (Act) on November 5, 1996, produced a conflict with federal
authorities and California physicians, patients, and state law enforcement
authorities. Federal authorities threatened to prosecute anyone who
violated federal drug laws despite enactment of state statutes legalizing
limited marijuana possession and use.6 A group of physicians and patients
who found use of marijuana beneficial for pain control obtained an
injunction against the federal government preventing federal agencies
from pursuing action against physicians in California who discuss
marijuana usage with their patients.7
People v. Trippet is the first case in which the Compassionate Use
Act was used as an affirmative defense to a marijuana possession charge
in California. The Court of Appeals for California, First District, Division
2 held a woman could retroactively apply the Act as a partial defense to
a marijuana possession charge.8 Additionally, the scope of the Act was
broadened to include protection against the transportation of marijuana,
which was not explicitly addressed in the wording of the Act.9 The court
also recognized two levels of physician participation regarding patient
marijuana usage: recommendation or approval.'0 Finally, the court did
note that a person was not entitled to an unlimited quantity of marijuana,
but rather a quantity sufficient to relieve the patient's pain.'"
This article provides an overview of the role of marijuana in the
medical setting and its implications for the legal environment. The first
section outlines the history of marijuana statutes and case decisions which
prohibit usage of marijuana for either medicinal or personal reasons. The
second section examines the decision in Conant v. McCaffrey, in which
a California judge issued an injunction preventing the federal government
from prosecuting California residents for violations of the federal drug
4See OmO REv. CODE ANN. 2925.03(F) (Anderson 1996), VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.1
(Michie 1996).
5CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1997).
'The Administration's Response to the Passage of California Proposition 215 and Arizona
Proposition 200, 62 Fed.Reg. 6164 (1997) [hereinafter Response].
7Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conant v. McCaffrey, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 97-0139).
'People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 561-62 (Ct. App. 1997).
91d. at 571.
Id. at 569.
"Id. at 570.
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laws in situations which fall under the Act. The third section examines the
decision in People v. Trippet, the first case to invoke the Act. The final
section discusses the implications of the decision in People v. Trippet and
the new boundaries that have been created regarding the legality of
marijuana in California.
HISTORY OF MARIJUANA LAW
What is Marijuana and What Does It Do?
Marijuana is derived from the hemp plant that contains the active
ingredient delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinal (THC).12 Most marijuana found
in the United States has a THC content of less than one percent.' 3 Higher
THC content cannabis derivatives such as hashish are also available, but
less common in the United States. 14 Users of marijuana, who usually
consume it by inhalating THC into the lungs, experience short-term
physiological effects such as a slight increase in pulse, decreased
salivation, a slight reddening of the eyes, and some impairment of
psychomotor control. 5 These effects normally subside within two to three
hours of inhalation.16 Experts have been split as to the long term effects
of marijuana usage. Although some researchers have linked marijuana to
negative effects on the body's immune system, chromosomal structure,
and testosterone level, the National Commission on Marihuana [sic] and
Drug Abuse reported that "no significant physical, biochemical, or mental
abnormalities could be attributed solely to [a person's] marijuana
smoking."' 7 While marijuana use and resulting intoxication could create
a dangerous condition, such as during th& operation of a motorized
vehicle, there has not been a confirmed case of a fatal marijuana
overdose.18 Scientific experiments on animals have concluded the lethal
dose for marijuana is approximately 40,000 times the amount needed for
2Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 607 (Wash. 1997).
"Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 505 (Alaska 1975).
14Id.
"Id. at 506.
16Id.
17Id. (citing MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MSUNDERSTANDING, FIRST REOaT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHuANA AND DRUG ABUSE 61 (Mar. 1972).
'Ravin, 537 P.2d at 508.
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intoxication.' 9 In addition to the active ingredient THC, marijuana
contains over 400 other substances including over sixty cannabinoids.2°
Historical Perspective of Marijuana Law
Marijuana has not always been illegal in the United States. Marijuana and
the hemp plant from which it is derived, have been used for purposes such
as an analgesic and as a source of paper and textiles.21 For example,
several historical documents, including the Declaration of Independence,
were written on hemp.22 In the nineteenth century, marijuana was listed
in the United States Dispensatory and was considered "a drug that has
special value in some morbid conditions and the intrinsic merit and safety
of which entitles it to a place once held in therapeutics."23 Until 1937,
marijuana was found in drug stores alongside other common
medications.24
In 1937, however, due to pressures from the cotton, timber, and
chemical industries, as well as from new federal drug control agencies, a
stamp tax25 was introduced which made it almost financially impossible
to procure, possess, or use marijuana without criminal penalties.26 The
purpose of the tax was to raise revenue from marijuana traffic and to
"discourage the current and widespread undesirable use of marihuana [sic]
by smokers and drug addicts."'27 There were two main parts to the Act: (1)
an occupational tax for those who dealt marijuana, and (2) a tax on
28transfers of marijuana. Any person who dealt marijuana had to pay an
annual tax at a varying rate depending on which role the person played in
the process; such roles included: importers, producers, physicians,
191d.
2 Seeley v. State, 940 P.2d 604, 607 (Wash. 1997) (Cannabinoids, of which THC is one, are
the active ingredients in marijuana.).
2 Marty Bergoffen & Roger Lee Clark, Hemp as an Alternative to Wood Fiber in Oregon,
11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 119, 120 (1996); LESTER GRINSPOON, M.D., & JAMES B. BAKALAR,
MARIUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 5-6 (1993).
'Bergoffen & Clark, supra at 21, at 120.
"Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 21, at 120 (quoting Dr. J.B. Mattison, Cannabis Indica
as an Anodyne and Hypnotic, ST. LOUIS MED. SURG. J. 61, 266 (1891)).24Id.
2526 U.S.C. § 4741 et seq., repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1996 Supp.).
26Bergoffen & Clark, supra at 21.
27Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 21 (1969) (citing and quoting Hearings on H.R. 6385
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1937)).2826 U.S.C. §§ 4741-4742, 4751-4753 (1997).
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researchers, or millers.29 There was also an "other" category which taxed
persons not falling into one of the pre-approved categories.30 At the time
the tax was paid, the taxpayer was required to register his name and place
of business at the nearest Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office.3" The
transfer tax provisions imposed a tax on all transfers of marijuana at an
amount determined by whether the transferee had registered with the
RS.32 Registered transferees had to pay a one dollar fee per ounce,
whereas non-registered transferees had to pay a $100 fee per ounce.33
Every transfer had to be carried out on a written order form showing the
name and address of the transferor and transferee, their registration
numbers, and the amount of marijuana transferred. 4
Simultaneous to the Marijuana Tax Act was the existence of the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act.35 This act covered the illegal
importation and smuggling of marijuana, set penalties for such illegal
importation and smuggling, and made unexplained possession of
marijuana sufficient evidence for a conviction unless the defendant could
sufficiently explain the reason for the possession to a jury. Additionally,
all states had statutes which made the possession of any quantity of
marijuana a crime.37
Leary v. United States: Repeal of the Marijuana Tax Act
and Adoption of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970
The simultaneous existence of the Marijuana Tax Act and the National
Drug Import and Export Act created a "catch 22" for marijuana users.
Failure to comply with the Tax Act effectively created a per se violation
of both federal and state marijuana laws; while complying with the Tax
Act resulted in a condition where the value of the marijuana was less than
the total tax costs. The judicial system confronted this problem in Leary
7"See id. §§ 4751()-(4), (6).3 old
31See id. § 4753.
32See id. §§ 4741-4742.
33See id. § 4741.
-See id. § 4742.
21 U.S.C.A. § 176(a), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1996 Supp.).
31See id.
'Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 16 (1969).
1997] 159
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v. United States. In 1965, Dr. Timothy Leary was indicted and later
convicted for illegally smuggling marijuana into the United States and for
failure to pay the transfer tax.38 Dr. Leary argued had he obtained the
order form for the transfer tax, he would have identified himself as an
unregistered transferee who also had not paid the occupational tax.
39
These facts "would surely [have] prove[n] a significant 'link in the chain'
of evidence tending to establish his guilt' under the state marihuana [sic]
laws then in effect."4 The court agreed with Leary's contention that had
he complied with the provisions of the Tax Act, it would have amounted
to self-incrimination under state narcotics laws.4 Additionally, the
Supreme Court held the presumption under the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act, namely that the majority of marijuana possessors knew the
marijuana was grown outside the United States, and thus, was illegally
imported into the country, was invalid under the Due Process Clause.42
Thus, both the Marijuana Tax Act and the Narcotic Drugs Import and
Export Act were found to be unconstitutional.
In response to the Leary v. United States decision, Congress passed
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, which placed all controlled
substances into five schedules of varying restrictions.43 The restrictions
covered the manufacturing, distribution, and usage of all controlled
substances. 44  Registration requirements existed for physicians,
pharmacists, and manufactures of controlled substances.45 Marijuana was
placed in Schedule I, which prohibited any use or distribution of the
substance unless it was part of an FDA pre-approved research study
conforming to stringent storage and record keeping requirements.46
Schedule I drugs were so classified if they:
1) had a high potential for abuse,
3ad. at 10-1 1.
"Id. at 16.
40Id. (citing and quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,48 (1968)).
41Id. at 29.
42Leary, 395 U.S. at 53.
'Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1996
Supp.).
"Id.
4S1d
.41See id. §§ 822-23, 872.
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2) had no currently acceptable medical or treatment use in the United
States, and
3) had no accepted safety for use in medically supervised treatment 7
Under the Act, marijuana could not be prescribed legally by a physician
nor could a pharmacist fill a marijuana prescription unless the research
exception was granted.4"
Marijuana Use Is Not a Fundamental Right,
Except in the Home?
Despite the statutory ban on marijuana use, there have been several cases
which have attempted to assert the federal government's actions of placing
marijuana into Schedule I violate certain individual fundamental rights.
However, courts overwhelmingly have refused to recognize any
fundamental right to smoke marijuana for any reason. In State v. Smith,
the Washington Supreme Court held "[t]he right to smoke marijuana is not
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, it is not necessary to
ordered liberty, and it is not within a zone of privacy.' 9 Other courts
have agreed marijuana possession is not a fundamental right guaranteed
by the United States Constitution."
Ravin v. State was the only example of a court's recognition of any
fundamental right regarding marijuana.5' Ravin, arrested for marijuana
possession in violation of a state statute, attacked the constitutionality of
the statute by arguing his right to privacy had been violated.' He
contended his fundamental right to privacy was broad enough to include
the possession of marijuana for personal use.53 The court noted "the right
to privacy may afford less than absolute protection to the 'ingestion of
47See id. at § 812(b)(1).
49State v. Smith, 610 P.2d 869 (Wash. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 873 (1980).
"See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C.
1980); State v. Anonymous, 355 A.2d 729 (Conn. 1976); Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898
(Mass. 1969); People v. Alexander, 223 N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 1974); Kreisher v. State, 319 A.2d
31 (Del. Super. 1974).5'Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
'Id. at 496.
-"Id. at 497.
1997]
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food, beverages or other substances."'' 4 The court continued by stating
that "there is not a fundamental constitutional right to possess or ingest
marijuana in Alaska."55 Additionally, the court noted the state had a
strong interest in protecting its citizens from impaired drivers who had
used marijuana.5 6 Despite these findings, the court continued its analysis
by looking into the distinctive nature of one's home as a place where one's
privacy accords special protection.57 Although the court noted the state
needed a control mechanism for marijuana in as far as it applies to the
safety of the public, "given the relative insignificance of marijuana
consumption as a health problem in our society at present, we do not
believe that the potential harm generated by drivers under the influence of
marijuana, standing alone, creates a close and substantial relationship
between the public welfare and control of ingestion of marijuana or
possession of it in the home for personal use.,18 The court went on to
conclude that "no adequate justification for the state's intrusion into the
citizen's right to privacy by the prohibition of possession of marijuana by
an adult for personal consumption in the home has been shown." 59
Marijuana as Medicine
Although many of the legal battles surrounding marijuana have involved
the recreational use of the drug, many people also argued marijuana
provided a form of pain relief not found in other medications. In State v.
Diana, a man convicted of marijuana possession was allowed to establish
that marijuana had a beneficial effect on the symptoms of multiple
sclerosis. 60 The defendant argued his use of marijuana was medically
necessary and justified his possession.6 The appeals court noted only one
other case existed where the defense of medical necessity was applied to
marijuana possession.62 In United States v. Randall, the defendant had
-id. at 501 (citing Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974) which stated: "But the
right to privacy is not absolute. Where a compelling state interest is shown, the right may be held
to be subordinate to express constitutional powers such as the authorization of the legislature to
promote and protect public health and provide for the general welfare.")
"SRavin, 527 P.2d at 502.
56Id.
'
71d. at 503.
"
8Id. at 511.
S 9d.
6 State v. Diana, 604 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
61Id. at 1315.621d. at 1316.
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grown marijuana plants for treating his glaucoma.63 The court concluded
Randall's interest in preserving his sight outweighed the government's
interest in outlawing marijuana. The court also placed special importance
on Randall's right to "preserve and protect his own health and body."54
More recently, in Jenks v. State, a Florida couple was charged with
cultivating marijuana plants in their home.6 ' Both the man and the
woman were suffering from AIDS-related conditions which produced
rapid weight loss and severe nausea. 6 At trial, the couple's physician
testified they suffered from severe debilitating nausea for which only
marijuana could provide relief.67 The physician also testified he would
have prescribed marijuana if he legally could have done soF 3 The court
found the couple to have successfully argued the defense of medical
necessity."
Despite patients suffering from debilitating illnesses praising the
medical benefits of marijuana, it continues to be classified as a Schedule
I drug. However, the medicinal benefit of the marijuana component THC
was acknowledged in 1985 when the Food and Drug Administration
approved a synthetic pill version of THC, commonly known under its
brand name of Marinol.70 Marinol was approved for use in the treatment
of vomiting and nausea, and its effects were purported to be identical to
that of cannabis in proportionate amounts ! In 1991, the FDA expanded
Marinol use to include treatments to combat rapid weight loss in AIDS
patients.
Synthetic THC has not been an answer for all. Many patients have
contended the natural version of cannabis provided significantly better
effects in controlling pain and nausea. 3 Problems with the synthetic THC
6 Id. (citing United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1976)).
"Id
6'Jenks v. State, 582 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); for another discusion of
marijuana use for glaucoma, see also Florida in State v. Mussika, 14 F.LVW. 1 (17 Cir. Ct. 1933).
"Id.
67d at 678.
68M.
6Id. at 679.
7047 Fed. Reg. 10082-83 (1985).
711d.
72Plaintiff s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conant v. McCaffray, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 97-0139).
3Id.
1997]
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have included the difficulty for some patients in taking the pill orally and
objections to the single immediately acting dosage of THC, rather than
receiving the use of a method of delivering that produces effects
gradually.7 Additionally, the cost of Marinol was prohibitive for many
of the patients who would have benefitted from its use. 5 Therefore, many
patients have continued to use marijuana illicitly, often with the implicit
approval of their treating physicians.76
Both before and after the approval of Marinol, efforts were
undertaken to declassify marijuana as a Schedule I drug. The first effort
to reschedule marijuana started in 1972, when the National Organization
for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) filed a petition with the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) requesting marijuana
be removed from the Controlled Substances Act altogether, or for
marijuana to be reclassified as a Schedule V drug, the least restrictive
category.77 Courts have heard reclassification petitions a total of five
times.78 Probably the closest marijuana proponents have come to
reclassifying marijuana occurred in 1988, when NORML and other pro-
marijuana organizations presented evidence about the purported medical
benefits of marijuana before Administrative Law Judge Young.79 Judge
Young concluded marijuana had been accepted as a medically effective
and safe form of relieving distress among very sick patients.80 Therefore,
he concluded the Drug Enforcement Administration would be acting in
an "unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious" manner if it continued to deny
marijuana access to very ill patients.8 Despite this ruling and
recommendation, the DEA retained marijuana as a Schedule I drug. 2
74Id.
751d.76Id.
'Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53767, 53773 (1989).
'See National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1974); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 559 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement
Admin. & Dept. of Health Educ. & Welfare, No. 79-1660 (D.C. Cir. Oct 16, 1980); Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Alliance for
Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin,. 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
"
9Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53767, 53773 (1989).
"
0Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Docket No. 86-22, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Drug Enforcement Admin. (1988).
"Id.2Denial of Marijuana Scheduling Petition, 54 Fed. Reg. 53767-78 (1989).
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The most recent attempt at marijuana rescheduling came in 1994 in
Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Dng Enforcement
Administration.83 By this time, rescheduling efforts had been scaled back
to requesting only that marijuana be reclassified from Schedule I to
Schedule ]1.14 The court used a five part test to determine whether
marijuana should be rescheduled:
1) whether the drug has a known and reproducible chemistry,
2) whether adequate safety studies were performed,
3) if there were well-controlled and adequate studies showing
marijuana's efficacy,
4) whether marijuana was accepted by qualified experts, and
5) whether scientific evidence of marijuana's efficacy was widely
available. 85
Once again, the court denied the petitioner's request for a scheduling
change, because marijuana had no "currently accepted medical use" as
defined by the five criteria.8 6
CALIFORNIA'S COMPASSIONATE USE ACT
The Compassionate Use Act (Act) was a 1996 ballot initiative which
sought to provide legal protection for severely ill patients who found
marijuana useful for reducing pain and other ailments.Y Prior to the Act,
'Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F3d 1131 (D.C. Cir.
1994).M4d. at 1132-33.
uald at 1135 (quoting Final Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,499 (Mar. 26, 1992)).95R.
87CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §11362.5 (West 1997) r.eads as follows:
"11362.5(a) This section shall be Imown and may be cited as the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996. (b)(l) The people of the State of California
hereby find and declare that the purposes of the Compassionate Use Act of 1995
are as follows: (A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to
obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed
appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that
the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of
cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or
any other illness for which marijuana provides relief. (B) To ensure that pattents
and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes
upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution
1997]
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several prominent physicians had acknowledged they had recommended
marijuana to their patients for many years. 8 Many medical professionals
believed marijuana was effective for relieving pain and nausea from such
severe illnesses and conditions as breast cancer, AIDS/IHIV, glaucoma,
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, paraplegia, and quadriplegia. 89 Also, the
procurement of marijuana had become quite public, an example of which
was the Cannabis Buyers Club in San Francisco which had sold marijuana
for medicinal purposes. 90 In August of 1996, the Cannabis Buyers Club
was raided by state narcotics agents and was permanently shut down.
91
The Act was overwhelmingly passed on November 5, 1996, and took
effect at 12:01 a.m. on November 6, 1996.92 The statute provided
California residents protection from state criminal prosecution for medical
marijuana possession, cultivation, and usage.93 The Act also granted
protection from state criminal prosecution to physicians who recommend
or approve marijuana use for their patients.94 The scope of the Act was
or sanction. (C) To encourage the federal and state governments to implement a
plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients
in medical need of marijuana. (2) Nothing in this act shall be construed to
supersede legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in conduct that endangers
others, nor to condone the diversion of marijuana for nonmedical purposes. (c)
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be
punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to
a patient for medical purposes. (d) Sec. 11357, relating to the possession of
marijuana, and Sec. 11358, relating to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply
to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver, who possesses or cultivates
marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the written or oral
recommendation or approval of a physician. (e) For the purposes of this section,
"primary caregiver" means the individual designated by the person exempted
under this act who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health,
or safety of that person."
88Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
89Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conant v. McCaffrey, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (No. 97-0139, p.21-25).
90State Raids Marijuana Club Agents: Sales May Not Have Been Limited to Medically
Needy (last modified Aug. 5, 1996), <http://newslibrary.infi.net/sj/>.
91Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20,23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). In December of 1997, the
Court of Appeals upheld the injunction, stating the Compassionate Use Act did not exempt a
person who sells, provides, or gives away marijuana to a patient or primary caregiver. Id. at 30.
Furthermore, organizations which sell marijuana commercially, such as the Cannabis Buyers' Club
do not qualify as a primary caregiver under the Act. Id.92Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686.
93CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (d) (West 1997).
94See id. §11362.5 (c).
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strictly medicinal, and it did not grant any right to use, possess, or
cultivate marijuana for nonmedicinal, recreational reasonsY5
Following the passage of the Act, federal officials including Barry
McCaffrey of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Thomas
Constantine of the Drug Enforcement Administration, issued the
Administration's Response to the Passage of California Proposition 215
and Arizona Proposition 200 (Reponse). These officials condemned the
passage of the Act suggesting that any physician prescribing or other
persons using marijuana could still be subject to criminal prosecution
under federal laws regulating marijuana." In addition to criminal
prosecution, the Response threatened physicians who violated the
regulations regarding Schedule I substances with the possibility of DEA
registration revocation and denial of Medicare reimbursement.
CALIFORNIA VERSUS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CONANTv. MCCAFFREY
After the passage of the California legislation with the ensuing negative
federal response, physicians, patients, and nonprofit organizations filed a
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States.
The complaint alleged the federal medical marijuana policy violated the
First Amendment rights of the physicians and patients who may
potentially communicate with each other about marijuana's possible
medical benefits for certain serious medical conditions.!'3
The plaintiffs, ten physicians, five patients, and two nonprofit
organizations, filed the complaint in response to the federal government's
9 Seeid. §11362.5 (b) (2).
9
'
6Response, supra note 6, at 6164. (The statement begins: "The recent p1 a e of
propositions which make dangerous drugs more available in California and Arizona pa:es a threat
to the National Drug Control Strategy goal of reducing drug abuse in the United States ').
'Id. "Department ofJustice's (DO]) position is that a practitioner's action ofrccommZn1ding
or prescribing Schedule I controlled substances is not consistent with the 'public interczt' (as that
phrase is used in the federal Controlled Substances Act) and will lead to adrmini-trative action by
the Drug Enforcement Administration to revoke the practitioner's registration. DOJ and HHS ill
send a letter to national, state, and local practitioner associations and licensing board-, which states
unequivocally that DEA will seek to revoke the DEA registrations of physicians v.ho rccommand
or prescribe Schedule I controlled substances." Id.SConant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 635 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
1997]
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reaction to the passage of the Act.99 The patients were concerned that
physicians would be afraid to give patients their best medical judgment
regarding marijuana's potential use in alleviating pain and treating
disease) °° Thus, the fear of physician self-censorship would undermine
the integrity of the physician-patient relationship.'0 ' Also at issue was the
"chilling" effect the government's reactions would have on physician-
patient communication.,02
The government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on a
letter from the Assistant Secretary for Health and the Acting Assistant
Attorney General clarifying the government's marijuana policy.10 3 This
clarification to the Response stated that physicians could discuss medical
marijuana with their patients, but could not "intentionally provide their
patients with oral or written statements in order to enable them to obtain
controlled substances in violation of federal law." 04 This clarification
was intended to show the federal government did not intend to impose a
"gag rule" limiting physicians from appropriately communicating their
best professional judgments to their patients." 5 Despite the issuance of
the clarification, federal officials continued to threaten sanctions against
physicians. 6
The District Court for the Northern District of California held the
federal government's medical marijuana policy was "impermissibly
vague" and may have infringed on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights,
resulting in the interference of the physician-patient relationship. 07 The
"Plaintiffs Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conant v. McCaffrey, 172
F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
'"
0Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 686.
101ld.
102Id.
'O'Id at 687.
"'Id. (citing Declaration of Kathleen Moriarty Mueller. Mueller, the Assistant Secretary
for Health and the Acting Assistant Attorney General)
OS Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 688 (citing Mueller declaration).
"'BId. (In April of 1997, Defendant McCaffrey distributed materials at the American
Methadone Treatment Association conference which included the December 30, 1996
Administration Response to Proposition 215, yet made no mention of the subsequent clarification.
Furthermore, it "unequivocally stated that the administration would seek to revoke practitioners'
licenses, prevent practitioners from participating in Medicare and Medicaid programs, and impose
criminal sanctions on practitioners for 'recommending' marijuana to their patients." The
petitioners also presented the court with a series of press reports which presented varying
interpretations of the government's marijuana policy. Id. 172 F.R.D. at 688).
"'Id. at 685.
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court held the federal government's statements about the passage of the
Act were vague and ambiguous, causing physicians to censor speech that
would otherwise be protected under the First Amendment." 3 Since this
self-censored "chilled" speech violated a First Amendment right,
irreparable injury occurred. 9 However, the court did note the First
Amendment did not protect all forms of speech; namely, it did not cover
speech that was intertwined with criminal activity."0 Therefore, the court
found it necessary to establish a bright line as to where protected speech
ended and illegal conduct began."' The court determined the bright line
would be crossed when a physician participated in criminal conduct." 2
The court also found there were serious questions as to whether the
federal government had the authority to sanction physicians for conduct
relating to marijuana under either the Controlled Substances Act"3 or the
Medicare statute." 4 The court concluded the government could not take
action against physicians for recommending marijuana unless it could
show there was good faith evidence of actual criminal activity.' ' The
court then issued a preliminary injunction which limited the federal
government's ability to prosecute physicians for criminal offenses, revoke
prescription licenses, or prevent their participation in Medicare or
Medicaid reimbursement programs." 6
"'id at 696.
'°Id at 697 ("'The loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."' Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 370, 373 (1976);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1995).
n°Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 698 (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949); United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990)).
2 1d. at 698.
"3id. at 699 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 801-904 (1996 Supp.), § 824 provides for the revocation
of registrations under certain conditions. Prior to 1984, the DEA could suspend, deny, or revoke
a physician's prescription registration for three reasons: 1) falsification of an application to
dispense, distribute, or manufacture a controlled substance, 2) a felony conviction related to a
controlled substance, or 3) denial, revocation, or suspension of a state liccnse or registration). Sec
21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(1)-(3). In 1983, the Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act created a fourth
reason: violation of the public interest. See 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (1981); Trawick v. Drug
Enforcement Admin. 861 F.2d 72,75 (4th Cir. 1988).
"
4Conant, 172 F.R.D. at 699 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1324 (1996 Supp.); Sec. 1320
includes provisions for excluding physicians from Medicare program participation under certain
conditions).
"'Id. at 699.
1161d
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PEOPLE v. TRIPPET:
CALIFORNIA'S FIRST LITIGATION INVOLVING
THE COMPASSIONATE USE ACT
Following the sanctions imposed on the federal government in Conant v.
Mc~affi-ey, there were many questions as to how far the Act extended
medical marijuana rights to physicians in California. More significantly,
there had been no indication as to how far these rights would extend to
patients who chose to use marijuana as a method of pain or nausea relief.
The first case to address the patient's medical marijuana rights was People
v. Trippet.
In Trippet, the court held a defendant previously convicted of
marijuana possession could invoke the Compassionate Use Act as a partial
defense to her conviction." 7 The court also held there were two tiers of
physician involvement: recommendation and approval, with approval
being a less formal act than recommendation." 8 The court also expanded
the protections under the act to include marijuana transportation, which
was not expressly dealt with by the statute." 9 Finally, the court concluded
a right to marijuana for medicinal use did not equate to a right to an
unlimited quantity of marijuana. 2
The defendant in Trippet was arrested for marijuana transportation
following a traffic stop.' 2' She had approximately two pounds of
marijuana which she contended was sometimes used for migraine pain
relief. 112 Her defense of medical necessity was not allowed at trial, and
she was convicted of marijuana possession on December 1, 1995.123 She
filed her appeal on November 4, 1996, one day before the passage of the
"'People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 571 (Ct. App. 1997).
"id. at 569.
"
91d. at 570-71.
1201d. at 570.
'
21id. at 562.
'"Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562. The vehicle was pulled over for a lack of a license plate
lamp light. The car was searched because the officer noticed a strong odor of marijuana coming
from the car. Two bags of a green leafy substance, later shown to be marijuana, and several hand-
rolled cigarettes were confiscated.
"During trial, in which the defendant represented herself, the defendant presented a
psychiatrist and self proclaimed "drug researcher" who testified during an evidentiary hearing
about the medical use of marijuana for migraines and other conditions. However, because the
defendant could not otherwise establish the required elements of a medical necessity defense, all
evidence, including the psychiatrist's testimony, was excluded by the trial court. Id.
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Act. 24  However, she made no mention of the Act in her brief '2
Following oral arguments in April 1997, the court granted additional time
for briefing as to the applicability of the Act to the defendant's case.'
26
The first issue the Trippet court addressed was whether the common
law medical necessity defense was properly excluded at the defendant's
trial' 27 Although the defense of "necessity" was recognized in California,
only one previous case involved the defense of "medical necessity."'' 3 To
sustain her defense of medical necessity, the defendant was required to
establish six elements:
1) she transported and possessed marijuana to prevent a significant evil,
2) she had no adequate alternative to marijuana,
3) the harm from possessing and transporting marijuana was not greater
than the harm avoided,
4) the defendant believed her actions were necessary to prevent a greater
harm,
5) her belief was objectively reasonable, and
6) she did not contribute to the creation of the emergency situation."
To exclude her defense of medical necessity, the court had to look no
further than the second requirement, that the defendant have no alternative
than to possess and transport marijuana since she had the alternative of
using Marinol.13
0
The defendant also contended her arrest infringed upon her First
Amendment right of the free exercise of religion.' The court, however,
held the religion neutral laws governing marijuana did not infringe upon
'
24Id.
't -he Attorney General briefly noted the Act, but did not address its relevance to the case.
'"At this time, the defendant had retained counsel, who initially argued that the Act vwa not
applicable to the defendant's fact situation. Later, that position was changed and her counzcl
conceded that the Act may indeed apply. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
'
27 1d. at 563.
SId. (citing People v. Forster, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1746, 1759 (1994), vhich azsuma; a
medical necessity defense could be valid, but does not discuss it any further).
'"Id. (citing People v. Pena, 197 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 14, 25-6 (1933)).
1311d. The court determined that Marinol "does afford [appellant] some relief," and therefore,
was a "'reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law' by possessing and transprtng
marijuana." Id.
"'Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563.
1997]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
the defendant's religious rights or beliefs.'32 Further, the defendant did
not exhibit a strongly held religious belief, which was required to invoke
a religious freedom defense.'33
The court then discussed the applicability of the Act to the
defendant's appeal. 34 The first issue was the retroactivity of the Act, as
Trippet had been convicted of marijuana transportation almost one year
before the Act took effect. 35 Her appeal was filed one day before the Act
was enacted, and her brief made no mention of the Act as a possible
defense.' 36  Nevertheless, the court found the Act was available
retroactively to the defendant because her appeal was still pending. 137 The
court noted the legislature had presumed that intervening statutory
amendments decriminalizing formerly illegal conduct would extend to
defendants with pending appeals. 1
38
The next issue before the court was the applicability of the Act to the
defendant's factual situation. 39 The court noted the rationale behind the
Act was to provide relief for those in severe pain.40 The court also noted
there was no indication of a legislative intent of the Act to substantially
alter California's existing drug laws; therefore, the court would not
supersede existing legislation prohibiting persons from engaging in
321d. at 565 (citing Employment Div., Oregon Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990) which noted that a state may prohibit "religiously inspired" drug use without
violating the First Amendment); People v. Peck, 52 Cal. App. 4th 351, 358 (1996) (stating that
religion-neutral criminal drug laws "need not be supported by a compelling state interest"), People
v. Werber, 19 Cal. App. 3d 598, 607-10 (1971).
13 Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66. The defendant attempted to argue under Frazee v.
Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 830-34 (1989), that her actions only had to
be religiously motivated and not a part of a recognized religious group. However, the court held
under the implicit standard in Frazee, the defendant must have had a strongly held religious belief
to invoke the First Amendment. The defendant never made a showing as to what her religious
beliefs were either at trial or on appeal. Id. at 565-66.
'
341d. at 566.
"
3sTrippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
1361d.
'"7Id. at 567.
"id. (citing People v. Rossi, 18 Cal. 3d 295,299-302 (1976), which relied onIn re Estrada,
63 Cal. 2d 740 (1965) holding "a superseding reduction in the punishment accorded a particular
violation could be applied retroactively; ... 'the common law principles reiterated in Estrada apply
a fortiorari when criminal sanctions have been completely repealed before a criminal conviction
becomes final"'). See also People v. Babylon, 39 Cal. 3d 719, 722 (1985) (stating "... absent a
saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the
pendency of his appeal .... ).
'
3
"Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
4Old. at 567.
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conduct dangerous to others, or legislation prohibiting marijuana use for
nonmedical purposes. 14' Deferring to the legislature, the court rejected the
defendant's assertion that the Act provided wide latitude regarding the
possession, transportation, and procurement of marijuana in California.14
The court then addressed two background issues. First, the court
looked at the amount of marijuana in the defendant's possession.'43 In
California, persons who possessed more than 2S.5 grams of marijuana
faced more severe punishment, including possible imprisonment, than
those who possessed less than that amount.' 44 The defendant had
approximately two pounds of marijuana, more than thirty times the trigger
amount for the higher penalty.
4 1
Second, because the defendant admitted her marijuana use sometimes
related to her relief from migraine pain, but that other times the use was
related to "spiritual purposes", the court concluded the defendant could
only rely on the Act as a partial defense to the charges. 14 The court,
having already found the defendant's defense of religious freedom had
failed, found the Act could only be invoked in as far as her marijuana use
related to her migraines, and not to her religious or spiritual beliefs. 47
The court then considered to what extent the defendant was entitled
to a partial defense under the Act. 43 The court stated the critical factor
was whether the defendant's marijuana use was tied to the
recommendation or approval of a physician. 149 The defendant could not
1id at 567-8 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11362.5 (b) (2) (West 1997)). The
statute's drafters did not envision a significant change in the existing marijuana laws. While
marijuana plants may be grown for one's own personal use, police officers could still be able to
arrest those who grow too much or attempt to sell it to others. Police are still able to arrest anyone
for marijuana offenses. This statute simply gives those arrested a defense in court if they can
prove the marijuana use was in conjunction with a physician's approval. Id. at 568.
142L at 568 ("To hold as she effectively urges would be tantamount to suggesting that the
proposition's drafters and proponents were cynically trying to 'put one over' on the voters and that
the latter were not perceptive enough to discern as much.").
1431d
'"Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 56S (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 and § 11360)
(West 1997).
141d The court assumed as true the Attorney General's assertion that this amount of
marijuana would have created between 500 and 900joints. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 56S n. 9.
'"Id. at 568.
"Iadat 568-9. At the preliminary hearing, the arresting officer testified that when he azkcd
the defendant how much marijuana she smoked, her reply was that she smoked as much as she
could, she cooked with it, and did everything else she could do with marijuana. Id. at 569 n. 11.4 STrippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 569.
149id.
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show that marijuana had been recommended to her by her physician,
because, at an evidentiary hearing, her physician flatly denied
recommending marijuana to the defendant. 5 However, the court found,
based on the physician's testimony, he may have implicitly approved the
use of marijuana for the defendant's migraines.' The court determined
the terms "recommendation" and "approval" denoted slightly different
levels of action, and "approval" was a slightly less formal act than
"recommendation." '52 Because the record was incomplete as to whether
the defendant's psychiatrist-physician approved, or another physician had
either approved or recommended marijuana, the court held open the
possibility the defendant could show some physician either recommended
or approved marijuana for her migraines.'53
The court then stated that even in the face of physician
recommendation or approval, the defendant could not possess an
unlimited quantity of marijuana.' 54 "The statute certainly does not mean,
for example, that a person who claims an occasional problem with arthritis
pain may stockpile one hundred pounds of marijuana just in case it
suddenly gets cold."' 55 The level of marijuana held to be acceptable was
an amount reasonably related to a patient's current medical needs. 5 6 The
factual determination as to what constituted a reasonable amount would
come in part from the nature of the physician recommendation or
approval, such as whether the physician suggested a certain frequency or
dosage.
57
The final issue addressed by the court was whether the transportation
of marijuana was also covered under the Act.'58 The Act only specified
two types of activities relating to medical marijuana: possession and
'sold.
'Id. At the trial court, the defendant testified outside the jury that she thought she had "a
valid verbal prescription" from her psychiatrist and that he "recommend[ed] marijuana to [her] and
he would oversee it if the law allowed him to do so." Id. at 569.
"
2 Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d at 569.
"Id. at 569-70 (The psychiatrist also testified that he did not think he was the defendant's
only physician).
'S41d. at 570 ("The ballot arguments of the proponents ... are simply inconsistent with the
proposition that either the patient or the primary caregiver may accumulate indefinite quantities
of [marijuana]."
ISId.
IS7 Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570.
'581d.
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cultivation."5 9 The court noted that generally, exceptions to statutes are
not created in cases where the statutes specifically spelled out the types of
conduct covered. 6' Therefore, the defendant should have known the Act
did not explicitly cover the transportation of marijuana.6 The court
stated, however, the Act might be interpreted more liberally when there
were companion charges covered under the Act.16 If the transportation
of marijuana continued not to be covered under the Act, an asinine result
might follow. "[T]he voters could not have intended that a dying cancer
patient's 'primary caregiver' could be subject to criminal sanctions for
carrying otherwise legally-cultivated and possessed marijuana down a
hallway to the patient's room."' 63 The court, however, did not provide
that all transportation was covered under the Act.' 6' Rather, the test to be
used was "whether the quantity transported and the method, timing and
distance of the transportation are reasonably related to the patient's current
medical needs." 16 Thus, the defendant was required to show transporting
two pounds of marijuana met this test.' 6" The court then vacated and
remanded the defendant's case to the trial court for additional proceedings
consistent with the court's conclusions. 67
THE IMPACT OF THE TRLPPETDECISION ON THE
SCOPE OF THE COMPASSIONATE USE ACT
The Retroactivity Issue
Not only does the California legislation affect future marijuana cases, but
it allows any person with a pending marijuana conviction to invoke the
Act as a partial or complete affirmative defense on appeal. In People v.
Trippet, the defendant had been convicted of marijuana possession and
1
-
91d (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357, § 11358) (Vest 1997).
Id.; see People v. Municipal Court, 20 Cal. 3d 523, 532 (1978).
"'Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 570. The defendant argued that the Act impliedly provided
a defense to the marijuana transportation charge as well, and that "transportating [manjuana] is
a necessity as a matter of law."' However, the court declined to extend tramsportation protection
absolutely. Id. at 570.
z62Trippet. 66 Cal. Rptr.2d at 571.
163Id.
t6Id.
166Id
'"Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
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transportation almost one year prior to the passage of the Act. 168
Additionally, briefing for the appeal was completed one day before the
passage of the Act, with no mention of the Act's applicability either for or
against the defendant. 1
69
The court concluded, and the California Attorney General conceded,
that absent wording to the contrary, the legislature, should be presumed
to have extended to defendants whose appeals are pending, the benefits of
intervening statutory amendments which decriminalize formerly illicit
conduct or reduce the punishment for acts which remain unlawful. '70
The impact of retroactivity would provide relief for those defendants
with pending marijuana convictions. For many, it would provide a new
defense for crimes occurring before the passage of the Act; in other words,
for acts that were illegal when they occurred. Although it is unknown
exactly how many defendants would be able to apply the Act, what is
known is that of all narcotics offenses, marijuana crimes are the most
frequently prosecuted and convicted. 7' Additionally, during the 1990s, the
number of marijuana possession and transportation convictions has
steadily increased every year.7 2 Should prosecutors, law enforcement
officials, and judges experience increased volumes of marijuana appeals,
there may be greater consideration taken before prosecuting future
marijuana cases, should the factual situations produce murky waters
surrounding the applicability of the Act. Therefore, the retroactivity of
this Act could substantially change the landscape of both marijuana
conviction appeals as well as future marijuana prosecutions.
The Court's Distinction Between Approval
and Recommendation
The court in Trippet went to great lengths to distinguish the level of
physician involvement between that of "approval" and that of
"recommendation." The Act states, in part, that possession and cultivation
of marijuana will be protected against criminal prosecution if it is used for
personal medical purposes with "the written or oral recommendation or
"'Id. at 562.
169Id.
'
701d. at 567.
17lid 
6'7Trippet, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
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approval of a physician."' ' The court noted approval involves lesser
involvement than recommendation, yet the court never expressly defined
what constituted the act of approval versus the act of recommendation.
The court also did not give any boundaries as to what action on the part
of a physician would constitute the lower threshold approval standard.
For example, there is no indication a physician would have to utter the
words "I approve of your marijuana use (for a particular medical
condition)." The question remains open as to whether a physician's tacit
approval, perhaps through a simple nod in response to a patient's stated
intention to use marijuana, would meet the threshold requirement for
approval.
At the upper end of the physician action spectrum, recommendation
must stop short of an actual prescription. Federal law still states
physicians are not permitted to indicate on a prescription pad the use of
marijuana in its natural form. 74 However, the California statute does
permit a "written" recommendation of marijuana.' The logical question
which arises from this nomenclature is whether future courts will choose
to establish a bright line between a recommendation written on a blank
pad of paper and a recommendation that happens to be on a prescription
pad. Although this distinction may not be a current issue for debate,
should physician recommendation or approval of marijuana increase over
time, thus creating increased demand, the question becomes whether
dispensaries of marijuana may require solid evidence of physician
recommendation through a written "prescription.' '176 Although such
prescriptions would not be tracked by state or federal authorities as are
other regulated drugs, the act of virtually writing a "prescription" would
effectively contradict the federal statutory language prohibiting such
physician activity.
Not only are physician prescriptions still illegal under the Act, but
evidence still exists that any written statement may violate the federal
drug policy. Referring back to Conant v. McCaffrey, permissible behavior
"7'CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1997).
17421 U.S.C. §§ 822-3, 872 (1981).
175 CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (d) (West 1997).
"'Although private dispensaries of marijuana have been shut dovm, there has been tall: of
publicly run dispensaries. County Supervisors in San Mateo County, California unanimously
agreed to craft a proposal to dispense contraband marijuana for medicinal uze at public clinics
while maintaining a ban on private cannabis clubs. Plans for First Public Pot Clinic In the
Pipeline, SAN JOSE MERCtRY NEWS, Nov. 19, 1997, at 1.
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of physicians did not include "oral or written statements in order to enable
[patients] to obtain controlled substances in violation of federal law."' 77
This would imply any written statement, regardless of whether it was an
actual prescription, could violate federal law. However, it seems unlikely
the federal government would affirmatively seek out physicians who write
down "approvals" or "recommendations" of marijuana in light of Conant
v. McCaffrey.
The Limit on Quantity
Another issue discussed by the California court in Trippet was the amount
of marijuana a medically needy patient could possess under the Act. The
court's definition of an acceptable level of quantity would be based on the
physician's opinion of the amount of dosage and frequency of use for the
patient's needs.178 Again, the question arises as to the level of physician
participation: physician designation as to the amount and frequency of
marijuana use requires a specific instruction to the patient. In such cases,
it would seem appropriate that the physician would write her
recommendation on paper so the patient accurately remembers what the
physician said. This again creates a blurry line between what constitutes
a formal prescription and a mere recommendation.
Essentially, the issue of quantity will come down to an individual
case-by-case determination of how much marijuana a person may possess.
Since no standards or quantity thresholds have been set, the court seems
to be stating that different people are entitled to different amounts of
marijuana. However, the question arises as to how far in advance one may
purchase marijuana: one week, one month, every three months, etc.
Additionally, no limits have been set regarding marijuana cultivated in the
home. One may need several hemp plants to obtain enough high quality
marijuana for the appropriate medical use, and yet no guidelines have
been established to determine the maximum number of plants a person
may possess.
The Transportation Issue
One interesting observation about the legislative scope of the California
statute is the legislature's omission of legal protection for marijuana
'77Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
""People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 570 (Ct. App. 1997).
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transportation from the wording of the Act. The Trippet court clearly
acknowledges this omission and questioned why the Act's drafters did not
simply state that section 11360 of the California Health and Safety Code,
which covers the transportation of illegal substances, was inapplicable to
medical marijuana cases 19 Although the drafters were explicit about the
cultivation and possession of marijuana, but not about its transportation,
the court stated "[w]e may not imply exceptions to our criminal laws when
legislation spells out the chosen exceptions with such precision and
specificity.' ' 80
Despite its explicit statement, the court created an occasion for
further analysis regarding whether Trippet could use the Act as a defense
to transporting two pounds of marijuana, despite the absence of statutory
language addressing transportation. 8' Although it would be absurd to
disallow the Act's applicability in the case where legally cultivated
marijuana was carried down a hallway to a dying patient, the court refused
to give any further guidelines as to what level of transportation is
permissible beyond the test of whether the quantity, method, timing, and
distance of the marijuana transported was reasonable. This leaves open
an extremely wide door of interpretation. For instance, it could be
reasonable for one to fly from San Diego to Sacramento with marijuana
intended for a dying patient, while it might not be reasonable for one to
walk across the street with marijuana purported to be for someone who is
feeling "a little under the weather." It is unclear at this time as to how
future courts will. address the various types of transportation, from
airplanes, to bicycles, to simply walking.
The transportation and quantity issues also converge when one thinks
of the methods available for procuring marijuana for medical use. With
the closing of private facilities such as San Francisco's Cannabis Buyers
Club, medically needy patients may have to travel long distances to
procure marijuana. Although marijuana seems to be widely and easily
available for those who need it, many patients may not feel comfortable
buying marijuana "off the street." Problems may arise from the likelihood
'791d. at 570.
"Id. (citing People v. Municipal Court, 20 Cal. 3d 523,532 (1978), which micst h2t v;hCn
the legislature has given criminal defendants specific discovery tools, the court will not e:ercise
its inherent powers to achieve a result which conflicts with the legislation by allowing for
additional discovery tools).3 8 Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 571.
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that some patients who procure marijuana from drug dealers may
unwittingly contribute to a more extensive illicit drug trade involving
"hard" drugs such as cocaine and heroin. The only other option would be
to grow one's own supply, which would require time and advance
planning. Faced with a limited means of procuring marijuana, it might be
entirely reasonable for one to "stockpile" marijuana as one could stockpile
other medications, simply because of the inconvenience that occurs in
simply procuring the drug.
The Facts Of People v. Trippet:
Is This What California Voters Had In Mind?
Perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the court's holdings in People v.
Trippet was the facts of the case itself. Although the defendant was not
suffering from a terminal illness, migraine conditions were specifically
recognized in the Act. 182 However, she was not bedridden and apparently
not in a debilitative state, and furthermore never provided evidence of a
diagnosis of migraine headaches from a physician to either the trial court
or appellate court.'8 Therefore, the court referred to her migraines as only
an "alleged" condition. 84 Although migraine headaches can be quite
painful and should not necessarily be taken lightly, the defendant admitted
her marijuana use was sometimes for "spiritual" purposes and other times
for "medical" purposes; even with the introduction of this information, she
never attempted to clearly identify the division between the two. 85
The court's willingness to allow the Act as a partial defense to the
defendant's offense was even more interesting when examined in the light
of the legislative intent behind the passage of the Act. The Act was
intended to help "seriously ill Californians," and this intention was written
into the Act itself'18 6 The determination then becomes, what constitutes
a "seriously ill" person, or whether "seriously ill" is an important element
of a physician's discussion of marijuana with a patient. The court in
People v. Trippet seemed to disregard any threshold level of illness that
is a prerequisite of protection under the Act. While few supporters of the
Act would question the right to use marijuana in the most critical of
"'See CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1997).
I"Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 562.
Ild. at 562.
"I5 d. at 568.
"'
86See CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1997).
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medical circumstances, there may be a point where a line will need to be
drawn between those truly "seriously ill" patients and those who are not
sufficiently ill and may be more able to use other forms of pain relief. If
this line is not drawn, California may be involved in further conflict with
the federal government. As of today, the federal government maintains a
strong position against any form of marijuana use, and does not recognize
that marijuana has any proven medical benefit.1S7 However, the Act's
success may depend on the state's ability to tightly regulate possession,
use, and now transportation of marijuana. Should the federal government,
and perhaps even some of California's citizens themselves, start to feel the
use of marijuana has spread beyond those who are truly and seriously ill,
the possibility of a backlash against any medicinal use of marijuana could
occur, especially if marijuana becomes too easily available to children,E3
Although there are many citizens who feel that marijuana should be legal
for all purposes, both medical and recreational, the passage of the
Compassionate Use Act was based a more moderate position. Should
these voters feel the scope of the Act has expanded beyond its original
purpose, the threat of a complete lack of access to marijuana could loom.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion provides insight into both the history of
marijuana laws in the United States, as well as the recent legal changes in
California law resulting from the enactment of the Compassionate Use
Act. As the issue of the legalization of marijuana will likely be a part of
the legal environment for years to come, the conclusions of the court in
People v. Trippet provide an intriguing starting point for possible future
applications of medical marijuana laws in other states. Also in flux is the
way in which the federal government will react to judicial decisions
regarding the medical use of marijuana.
The court in People v. Trippet expanded the boundaries of the
Compassionate Use Act in several ways. First, it applied the Act
retroactively to include defendants found guilty of marijuana use or
'"See 57 Fed. Reg. 10, 499 (1992); Response, supra note 6, at 6164. Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1996 Supp.); Alliance for Cannabis
Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Conant v. McCaffrey,
172 F.R.D. 681, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
"'See Response, supra note 6, at 6164.
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possession whose appeals were pending at the time of the passage of the
Act.'89 Also, the court distinguished two levels of physician participation,
that of recommendation or approval.' 9 Further, the court placed limits on
the quantity of marijuana an individual could possess for medical
purposes, although it did not explicitly state the maximum quantity of
marijuana that would be legal under the Act. 9' Lastly, the court expanded
the boundaries of the Act to include the limited protection of
transportation of marijuana for medical purposes.'92 However, the
question still remains as to how the federal government will react to
California's interpretation of its medical marijuana law as well as
interpretations of potential laws in other states.
"'People v. Trippet, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 571 (Ct. App. 1997).
'Id. at 569.
l9'Id. at 570.
921d. at 570-71.
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